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TAKINGS LAW IN THE AFTERMATH OF LUCAS V
SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL: DOES
THE BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES EXCEPTION
CLARIFY OR COMPLICATE REGULATORY
TAKINGS LAW?
Christie Olsson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United
States Constitution protects private individuals from having
their property taken by the government without compensa-
tion.' However, the constitutional proclamation "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation,"2 raises two questions: what qualifies as a "tak-
ing,"' and what is required for just compensation. It is how
the Supreme Court has dealt with these two questions that
leads to the ultimate issue of whether the Court's decisions
have clarified or complicated regulatory takings law.
Originally, the Takings Clause was only implicated when
the government physically occupied private property.4 Then,
in 1922, the Supreme Court noted that "while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."5 Unfortunately, the Court did
* Senior Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. Economics, Environmental Studies,
Lewis and Clark College.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
2. Id.
3. "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty." Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
4. Moore v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 603, 609 (E.D. Va. 1996).
5. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). This statement was
later recognized as the birth of regulatory takings law. Moore, 943 F. Supp. at
609.
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not provide a formula to determine when a regulation goes
too far.6 This lack of guidance has "initiated years of judicial
struggling to produce a workable formula to answer that
question." '
In an attempt to clarify when a regulation goes too far
and thus requires compensation, the Court initially intro-
duced a framework consisting of three factors! Later, in Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,9 the Court examined
the narrow situation in which a regulation deprived a prop-
erty owner of all the economic value of the land. 0 In Lucas,
the Court held that compensation for a regulatory taking is
not required if the property use in question could have been
prohibited by background principles of land ownership, such
as those found in property and nuisance law." This notion
will be referred to throughout this comment as the "back-
ground principles exception."
The current lack of clarity in takings law, in deciding
both when a regulation goes too far and what constitutes a
background principle to land ownership, has led to uncer-
tainty for owners and governments, federal, state, and local.
Whether a regulation goes too far or a use equates to a nui-
sance is a determination made after the fact. 2 From a private
perspective, these determinations are not always predict-
able." This unpredictability prevents the government from
effectively regulating harmful actions and also creates uncer-
tainty for landowners in their interest in their property.
Part II of this comment traces the history of regulatory
6. The Court stated that it was a "question of degree" and thus could not
furnish a general proposition. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
7. Hope M. Babcock, Has the US. Supreme Court Finally Drained the
Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?" The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HAv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 10-11 (1995).
8. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
10. Id. at 1007.
11. Id. at 1031-32.
12. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 13 (4th
ed. 1999). For example, the government will not know V hether a regulation ef-
fectively "takes" a private landowner's property until after the regulation has
passed and the court proceedings are completed. Likewise, a property owner
will not know prior to the start of the intended use whether neighbors or the
government will consider it a nuisance, as that is a determination made by the
court after the use has begun.
13. Id.
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takings, 14 examines the seminal case of Lucas,15 and discusses
the cases explaining and applying the background principles
exception." Part III identifies the legal problem posed by the
Lucas background principles exception, namely the uncer-
tainty created by the case law."7 Part IV of this comment ana-
lyzes how the background principles exception has been ap-
plied"8 and explains why the exception is not a useful
mechanism for determining when just compensation for a
taking is due. 9 Finally, in Part V, the comment presents an
alternative framework for addressing the issue aimed at in-
creasing the predictability and certainty in the area of tak-
ings law.2"
II. BACKGROUND
A. Takings Law Prior to Lucas
The Takings Clause was officially incorporated against
the states in 1897.21 Its purpose is to ensure that the public,
rather than private landowners, pay for the benefits of land
control.22 One of the first Supreme Court cases addressing
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. See discussion infra Part II.C.
17. See discussion (0fra Part III.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See id.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
Initially, the Supreme Court concluded that the Bill of Rights only applied to
the federal government. See Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32
U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) ("We are of opinion that the provision in the fifth
amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a limita-
tion on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not
applicable to the legislation of the states."). In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from taking property without just
compensation. See generally Cl& , Burlington & QuincyR.R., 166 U.S. at 226.
22. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (1922). The Mahons brought suit to prevent
Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property in a way that
would remove the sub-surface support of the land and cause a subsidence of the
surface and their house. Id. at 412. Although the coal company had a deed
granting it the right to all the coal under the surface of the land, the Mahons
contended that such mining was prevented by state law. Id. The Court found
that the state law did effect a taking of the coal company's right to mine. Id. at
415-16.
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the Takings Clause was Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon,23 which recognized that there may be regulatory tak-
ings in addition to physical takings.24 Justice Holmes, in his
now famous opinion, wrote that "[t]he general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."25
Following Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court, in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,6 upheld a local
zoning regulation that diminished the value of a landowner's
property. 7 The Court decided that zoning laws are justified
by the state's police powers." As long as the provisions of
zoning laws are not arbitrary and unreasonable and have a
"substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare,"29 the regulations will not be considered a
taking in violation of the Takings Clause. ° The Court guided
the states in defining their police powers by directing the
lower courts to "the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lae-
das,31 which lies at the foundation of so much of the common
law of nuisances."32
Returning to the problem of regulatory takings in Penn
Central Transportation Company v. New York City,33 the
Court examined the question of whether a city desiring to
protect historical buildings may go beyond its zoning laws to
place restrictions on the development of individual historic
landmarks without effecting a taking requiring the payment
of just compensation. 4 The majority recognized that there
was no set formula for determining when the government
must compensate for the economic injuries caused by public
23. Id. at 393.
24. The Court has traditionally considered a permanent physical occupation
of real property to be a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-28 (1982). This physical taking is different from a
regulation that diminishes the economic value of private property.
25. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
26. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
27. Id. at 397.
28. Id. at 387.
29. Id. at 395 (citing Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530-31
(1917), Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905)).
30. Id.
31. So use your own as not to injure another's property. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1690 (7th ed. 1999).
32. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. at 387.
33. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
34. Id. at 107.
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action rather than leave the burden disproportionately con-
centrated on a few people." The Court established three
main factors for the lower courts to consider when determin-
ing whether compensation is required: (1) the economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations," and (3) the character of the govern-
ment action.
The Court refined the takings analysis in Agins v. City of
Tiburon.39 In that case, the Court found that a general zoning
law effected a taking if the ordinance did not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest or denied an owner eco-
nomically viable use of the land."° The decision stated that
"[t]he determination that governmental action constitutes a
takings is, in essence, a determination that the public at
large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an
exercise of state power in the public interest. "'
The Court relied on Agins in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass2'n,4 when it determined that the
mere enactment of the Surface Mining Act43 did not constitute
a taking." The takings claim arose in the context of a facial
challenge to the law,45 as the provisions of the Act had not yet
35. Id. at 124.
36. Id.
37. Id. Investment-backed expectations are interests sufficiently bound up
with the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff to constitute "property" for
Fifth Amendment purposes. See generally id. at 125.
38. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
39. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
40. Id. at 260. As an example of a zoning ordinance that did substantially
advance legitimate state interests, yet did not deny an owner the economically
viable use of the land, the Court offered the "seminal" decision of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.: "Despite alleged diminution in value of the owner's
land, the Court [in Ambler Realty] held that the zoning laws were facially con-
stitutional. They bore a substantial relationship to the public welfare, and their
enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner." Id. at 261 (cit-
ing AmblerRealty, 272 U.S. at 395-97).
41. Id. at 260.
42. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
43. "The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute designed to 'estab-
lish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the ad-
verse effects of surface coal mining operations.'" Id. at 268 (citing Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 102(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. III
1976)).
44. See id. at 295-96.
45. Id. at 295. The Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association
brought a pre-enforcement action against the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
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been applied to any private landowners in Virginia.46 Since
there was no evidence that the Act itself denied owners eco-
nomically viable use of their land, it survived scrutiny.47
Returning to regulatory takings just five years later, the
Court again referenced nuisance law in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBeneditis." According to the Court, land-
owners' right to control their property is limited by the obliga-
tion that the use of the property shall not injure the commu-
nity.49  The Takings Clause thus does not require
compensation when the State asserts its power to protect the
lamation Act of 1977, a comprehensive statute regulating surface mining opera-
tions nationally. Id. at 268. The district court held that "the steep-slope provi-
sions ... effect an uncompensated taking of private property by requiring op-
erators to perform the 'economically and physically impossible' task of restoring
steep-slope surface mines to their approximate original contour," and the Act
also "effects an unconstitutional taking because it expressly prohibits mining in
certain locations and 'clearly prevent[s] a person from mining his own land or
having it mined.'" Id. at 293-94 (quoting Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 437, 441 (W.D. Va. 1980) (alteration in origi-
nal)).
46. Id. at 294. The Court prefers to determine the constitutionality of a
statute in actual, factual settings. Id. at 294-95 (citing Socialist Labor Party v.
Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972); Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549,
568-75, 584 (1947); Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461
(1945)). In explaining its adherence to this rule, the Court offered its rationale:
[The] Court has generally 'been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' Rather,
it has examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable in-
vestment backed expectations, and the character of the government ac-
tion-that have particular significance.
Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 296.
48. 480 U.S. 470 (1986). Pennsylvania had authorized its Department of
Environmental Resources to create a program which would prevent or minimize
subsidence and regulate its consequences. Id. at 476. Subsidence occurs when
the surface of the land is damaged because support below the surface is re-
moved, generally through mining. See id. at 474. Subsidence can cause damage
to buildings, roads, pipelines, cables, streams, water impoundments, oil and gas
wells, aquifers, and sewage, water and gas lines. Id. at 475 n.2. In order to
prevent damage of this kind, Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Re-
sources created a formula requiring a certain amount of the coal beneath pro-
tected structures to be kept in place as a means of providing surface support.
Id. at 476-77. The Coal Association brought suit for injunctive relief, claiming
that enforcement of the regulations constituted a taking of its private property.
Id. at 478-79.
49. Id. at 491-92 (citations omitted).
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community." The Court reasoned that "since no individual
has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything
when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activ-
ity."'
l
The Court explored the distinction between regulatory
and physical takings in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.5 Prior to Nollan, the Court had determined that there
is a "distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a
physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation
that merely restricts the use of property."53 In Nollan, the
Court hypothesized that if California had required the Nol-
lans to make a permanent easement across their beachfront
property available to the public in order to increase access to
the beach,54 that would have been a permanent physical occu-
pation, requiring compensation.55 Instead, California condi-
tioned the Nollans' permit to rebuild their house on their
agreement to make such an easement. 6 By applying princi-
ples of takings law, the Court determined that the lack of a
nexus57 between the condition, the easement, and the original
purpose of the building restriction, a clear view of the ocean,
made the condition an unconstitutional taking of the Nollans'
property."
B. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Before Lucas, the Supreme Court established one per se
rule for physical takings,55 created several factors to consider
when determining whether a regulation causes a taking re-
quiring compensation,' and acknowledged the power of the
50. Id.at 492 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 491 n.20.
52. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
53. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 (1982).
54. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Takings law requires an essential connection between the prohibition
and the ends advanced as the justification for the prohibition. See id. at 837.
58. Id. at 838.
59. All physical takings must be compensated. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
60. The court will consider the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
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states to enjoin nuisance-like activity.6 In its 1992 decision
in Lucas, the Court formulated the second per se rule of tak-
62ings.
In 1986, David Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential
lots on the beach in Charleston County, South Carolina.' He
intended to build single-family homes on the parcels.64 How-
ever, two years after he purchased the property, the South
Carolina legislature passed the Beachfront Management Act,
which effectively barred him from building any permanent
habitable structures on the two lots.65 The state trial court
found that the Act rendered his property valueless.66
Lucas represented the first occasion where a court found
that a legislative regulation had completely deprived the
landowner of all the economic value from a property. There-
fore, the Supreme Court had to determine whether this dra-
matic effect amounted to a taking of private property requir-
ing the payment of just compensation.6 The Court decided
that, where a regulation deprives land of all economic value,
the state does not need to compensate the landowner if the
nature of the property shows that the proscribed use interests
were never a part of the land title.69
While property owners generally expect to control their
property, the Court recognized that the property owner
should also expect the uses of his property to be restricted by
new regulations enacted by the state through its police pow-
ers.7" However, to avoid the requirement of just compensa-
tion, "regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use
of land ... must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership."7' Furthermore,
the Court clarified its position, holding that a law or regula-
tion that deprives land of all its economic value cannot
61. AmblerRealty, 272 U.S. at 387.
62. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
63. Id at 1006-07.
64. Id. at 1007.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1027.
70. Id.
71. Id at 1029.
Vol: 45
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achieve more than what adjacent landowners or the state it-
self could have achieved in the courts.72 The Court limited the
extent of a law or regulation to the result obtainable by pri-
vate parties through nuisance law or other background prin-
ciples of property law. Examples of the application of back-
ground principles include the right of states to destroy real
and personal property in cases of actual necessity 3 or other
grave threats to the lives and properties of others.74
In determining whether state nuisance law applies, the
Supreme Court suggested several factors for lower courts to
examine:
[T]he degree of harm to public lands and resources, or ad-
jacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed
activities, the social value of the claimant's activities and
their suitability to the locality in question, and the rela-
tive ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the govern-
ment (or adjacent private landowners) alike .... 
This nuisance analysis is inherent in most state property
laws. The analysis requires more than a conclusory state-
ment that the law violates common-law maxims such as sic
utere tuo ut alienurn non laedas.6 In Lucas, South Carolina
could prevail over Lucas' private rights if the state could
identify background principles of nuisance and property law
that prohibited Lucas' intended development.
7
While the Court created a second per se rule in takings
law, it was not unanimous in its declaration that nuisance
should be the touchstone for determining whether the regula-
tion effected a taking. Justice Scalia wrote the majority
72. Id.
73. One example of actual necessity would be the case of a forest fire, where
the local government must destroy a private landowner's property to prevent
the progress of the fire and eventual destruction of further property. Id. at 1029
n.16.
74. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. For example, the owner of a lakebed would not
be entitled to compensation if he wanted to engage in a landfill that would
cause flooding on others' lands. Id. Nor would the owner of a nuclear plant
have any recourse if it was later discovered that the plant was built on top of an
earthquake fault. Id.
75. Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 1031. See also supra note 31.
77. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32.
78. Id at 1036.
7152005
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opinion, 9 which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Thomas joined."0 However, Justice Kennedy
believed that the majority's use of the common law of nui-
sance was "too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society."8'
After the case was remanded to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in order to apply the Court's analysis to the facts
of Lucas, the state court determined that Lucas' proposed
building plans could not have been prevented by the common
law nuisance principles in that jurisdiction. 2
C. Takings Law after Lucas
Lucas fundamentally changed the way courts look at
regulatory taking cases by creating a per se rule: if a regula-
tion causes the complete loss of economic value in private
property, the government must pay for the taking unless it
can present a background principle of property law that
would have allowed the same result. 3 Since Lucas, the Su-
preme Court has returned twice to the issue of regulatory
takings, and both times, the Court limited Lucas.' In addi-
tion, several lower courts have interpreted Lucas, with vastly
different results. Most of these cases have held that the regu-
lation at issue in the particular case did not cause a complete
loss of value. 5 Even when there was a Lucas taking, result-
ing in a complete loss of value, many courts found that the
government had a valid defense of a background principle of
property law.8 A few cases have found a taking that required
79. Id. at 1005.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d. 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) (on re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court).
83. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32.
84. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
85. See Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 131
(2d Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 104 (2004); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United
States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Henry v. Jefferson County Plan-
ning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp, 2d 698, 706-07 (N.D. W. Va. 2001).
86. See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986-87 (9th
Cir. 2002) cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003) (using the public trust doctrine to
find that compensation was not needed); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United
States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2000) afird on reh'g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (relying on a navigational servitude); Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City
of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the contested right
Vol: 45
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compensation." One case even extended Lucas beyond real
property issues."
The Supreme Court first visited Lucas in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island89 Anthony Palazzolo owned a waterfront parcel
in Rhode Island, but could not develop it because of Rhode Is-
land's resource management council's wetlands regulations.9"
The regulations prohibited any infill of the wetland, which
prevented development on the wetland portion of Palazzolo's
property.91 The Court established the general principle that
"a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the prem-
ise that the landowner is left with a token interest."9 How-
ever, the Court did note that an upland site on the property
could be developed and would have an estimated value of
$200,000. 93 Because part of the property still retained value,
and thus there was not a complete taking, the Court found
Lucas to be inapplicable.9"
Although Lucas did not apply, the Court still referenced
the case and its requirement that the regulation's limitation
inheres in the title itself, in the restrictions of the state's
background principles of property and nuisance.98 The Court
emphasized that a legislative regulation is not transformed
into a background principle merely by passage into law.9
The following year, Lucas was again revisited, this time
to determine whether a temporary taking was nevertheless a
was never in Outdoor's title); M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148,
1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the regulation for reasons of public safety);
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993) (relying on
custom)..
87. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that there was a taking and that the regulation was not justified under
nuisance law); Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206,
209 (D.R.I. 2002) aftd, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that there was a tak-
ing, but the claim was time-barred).
88. Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(extending the theory behind Lucas to personal property, not just real property).
89. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
90. Id. at 611.
91. See id. at 621.
92. Id. at 631.
93. Id. at 621.
94. "A regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on
an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property 'economically idle.'" Id. at 631 (ci-
tations omitted).
95. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029). See also
discussion supra Part II.B.
96. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30.
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taking requiring compensation. 7 In Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,9" the
Court had to decide whether "a moratorium on development
imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-
use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring
compensation... ."" Similar to Palazzolo, this regulation dif-
fered from the one in Lucas in that it imposed only a tempo-
rary restriction that caused a diminution in value."' The
regulation did not cause a permanent deprivation of the
owner's use of the entire area.'' Since the regulation was
temporary, once the Regional Planning Agency lifted the re-
striction, the property would recover its economic value."2
Holding that claims of a temporary taking require a weighing
of all relevant circumstances, the Court determined that a per
se rule such as the one in Lucas was inappropriate. 1
03
With guidance from Palazollo and Tahoe-Sierra Preser-
vation Council, lower courts began to apply Lucas. The deci-
sions fall into three general categories: cases that distinguish
Lucas because there was not a complete loss of value, ' cases
that find no taking as the regulation was based on a back-
ground principle,' and cases that find a taking requiring
compensation. 
06
1. Cases that Distinguish Lucas
In the first category of cases, the lower courts found Lu-
cas inapplicable because there was not a complete loss of eco-
nomic value."' As the Court noted in Tahoe-Sierra, "Lucas
carved out a narrow exception to the rules governing regula-
97. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 306.
98. Id. at 302.
99. Id. at 306.
100. Id. at 332.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 335.
104. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572-73 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717, 735 (2002) a/fd,
381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
105. See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 986-87; Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at
1384; Outdoor Graphics, 103 F.3d at 694; M& J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1154; Stevens,
854 P.2d at 456-57.
106. See Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1552; Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp.
2d at 209.
107. See, e.g., Rith Energy, 247 F.3d at 1363; Florida Rock Indus., 18 F.3d at
1572-73; Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 737.
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tory takings for the 'extraordinary circumstance' of a perma-
nent deprivation of all beneficial use."'' 8 Finding a complete
and permanent deprivation of all economic or beneficial use
in property is a difficult standard to meet.' 9 Furthermore,
this determination also raises issues concerning how the
court determines the loss of value.110
Plaintiffs seeking a per se taking under Lucas frequently
raise the question of what is an appropriate denominator."'
For example, in Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, the Court
of Federal Claims was asked to determine what denominator
for determining property value was acceptable." 2 The plain-
tiff, Appolo Fuels, possessed certain mining leases, including
a lease to mine in a Tennessee county watershed."' Upon re-
108. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324 n.19.
109. For example, state courts have recognized that even land that cannot be
built upon retains some economic value, as the landowner can use the property
for recreation or camping. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. Justice Blackmun stated that the threshold determination of whether a
property has been deprived of all its economically valuable use cannot be de-
termined objectively. Id. at 1054. The answer to the question depends on how
"property" is defined, which in turn relies on the "composition of the denomina-
tor in [the] 'deprivation' fraction." Id. (citation omitted). A land use regulation
can be characterized as a deprivation of a specific entitlement, or it can be
viewed as a partial withdrawal from unencumbered ownership. Id.
111. There is some conflict in the Supreme Court precedent. In Tahoe-
Sierra, the Court held that "[w]hen the government physically takes possession
of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to
compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Coun-
cil, 535 U.S. at 322 (citation omitted). This seems to conflict with the Palazzolo
holding, where the Supreme Court decided that since an upland site on Palaz-
zolo's property could be developed and retain its economic value, there was not a
complete taking. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. Property owners have attempted
to apply the Tahoe-Sierra holding to regulatory takings, with little success.
112. Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 723. For example, consider a local or state
government that passes a regulation affecting part of the plaintiffs property. In
determining whether there was a complete loss of value, the court must decide
whether to examine only the economic value of the regulated portion of the
property, or the economic value of the entire property. While the regulated por-
tion of the property might have lost all of its economic value because of the
regulation, the property as a whole might still have significant value. If the
court were to only look at the regulation portion, it might find a taking requir-
ing compensation, whereas if the court looked at the entire property, there
might not be a taking. This scenario was first seen in Palazollo, where the Su-
preme Court decided that since an upland site on Palazzolo's property could be
developed and retained its economic value, there was not a complete taking and
Lucas did not apply. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
113. Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 719.
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quest by the local city,"4 the Office of Surface Mining Recla-
mation and Enforcement designated the affected watershed
area unsuitable for all surface coal mining operations."5
Looking at the parcel as a whole, instead of only the coal re-
serves within the regulated portion of the land,"6 the court
decided that the plaintiff's proposed denominator limited to
the regulated area of land was unsupportable. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit faced the same question in Rith Energy, Inc. v. United
States."8 Rith Energy Incorporated ("Rith") applied for a
permit to mine all of the coal within a leased eighty-nine-acre
area." ' The court held that the regulation must be measured
by its effect on the entire coal reserves covered by the permit,
not merely the portion remaining at the time Rith was forced
to stop mining. 20  Although the regulatory agency signifi-
cantly limited Rith's rights to mine, the company was still
permitted to mine enough coal to earn a substantial profit on
its investment in the leases. 2' Even though this did not
match Rith's investment-backed expectations, the court held
that the restraint was not a prohibition of all economically vi-
able use of Rith's property. 122
The court must also determine whose judgment to rely
upon in assessing the remaining economic value of a property
after the impact of a regulation. In Florida Rock Industries v.
United States,2 ' the plaintiff claimed that a denial of a per-
mit to mine for limestone underneath a wetland constituted a
taking of all economic value of the property.' The govern-
ment presented two assessors who testified as to the market
value of the property; 5 however, the plaintiff argued that po-
tential buyers were not fully aware of the restrictions on the
land and their consequences. Therefore, as the buyers were
not fully informed, they could not be considered willing buy-
114. Id. at 719-20.
115. Id. at 720.
116. Id. at 727.
117. Id.
118. Rith Energy, 247 F.3d at 1355.
119. Id. at 1363.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Florida Rock Indus., 18 F.3d at 1560.
124. Id. at 1562.
125. Id. at 1563.
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ers. Nevertheless, the court held that there was an active
real estate market, and a fair market value could be estab-
lished.127 The court determined it would be inappropriate for
a court to substitute its own judgment of value for that of the
market.128 Essentially, if there is a willing buyer for the land,
the land must have economic value, and the court will not
second-guess the buyer's judgment.
2. Cases that Apply the Background Principles
Exception
The second category of Lucas cases consists of situations
where the court held that there would have been a Fifth
Amendment taking but for some background principle of
property law that provided the government with a defense.
Common law principles that courts have relied upon include
129130 131public health and safety, 29 zoning, 0 nuisance, a naviga-
tional servitude,' custom,2 and the public trust doctrine."
In M & J Coal Company v. United States,135 the court
used the Lucas framework to analyze regulatory takings
claims, even though a complete deprivation was not at is-
sue.36  The Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation En-
forcement had ordered the plaintiff to cease mining as its
practices had caused an imminent danger to the health and
safety of the public.' M & J Coal Company claimed that the
126. Id. at 1566 n.12.
127. Id. at 1567.
128. Id.
129. M&JCoal, 47 F.3d at 1154.
130. Outdoor Graphics, 103 F.3d at 694-95.
131. Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 735. Even though the court did not reach
the issue of a government defense, as the court had already decided that there
was not a total economic loss of value, the court did state that water pollution is
an abatable nuisance. Id. This indicates that if the court had found a total eco-
nomic taking, the government still would have been justified in denying the
mining petition pursuant to the state's police powers. Id.
132. Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1384. See infra note 148.
133. Stevens, 854 P.2d at 456-57. See infra note 156.
134. Esplanade Properties, 307 F.3d at 986-87. See infra note 161.
135. M&JCoal, 47 F.3d at 1148.
136. Id. at 1153.
137. Id. at 1151. One resident
described extensive damage to his property. The resident reported that
the needle on his gas meter was "spinning wildly," that a section of the
gas line adjacent to the gas meter had been severed, and that his water
line to the public water supply was broken. In addition, the electric
wires leading to his house were stretched "as tight as a fiddle string."
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agency's action deprived the company of approximately
100,000 tons of coal, or $580,000.00 in lost profits.'38 Even so,
the company still made a profit on the mining, and thus this
was not a case of a complete economic loss of value.'39 Al-
though a Lucas analysis was unnecessary, the court nonethe-
less applied the Lucas framework that even if "a governmen-
tal action ... allegedly interferes with an owner's land use,
there can be no compensable interference if such land use was
not permitted at the time the owner took title to the prop-
erty.'
140
The court stated that the Lucas framework required look-
ing at the nature of the landowner's estate to assess whether
the land use interest was contained in the bundle of property
rights.14 Then, if the owner could prove the existence of such
an interest, the court would determine whether the govern-
mental action constituted a compensable taking.4 4 Applying
this principle to M & J Coal Company, the court held that the
plaintiffs rights did not include the right to mine in such a
way as to endanger the environment, as the plaintiff knew or
should have known that mining in such a way as to endanger
public health or safety would be prohibited.
4 3
Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington'4 involved
Outdoor's purchase of billboards subject to a non-conforming
use;145 however, the company failed to renew the certificates
The resident expressed concern about the possibility of a gas explosion
and its effects on the safety of his family and neighbors. Mining opera-
tions had caused large cracks to develop in the surface of his property
and a neighbor's dog had fallen into a crack to its death. The resident
believed that neighborhood children were at risk of similar harm.
Id. The regulatory agency agreed that "the public was at risk of injury from
large cracks in the ground, collapsing structures, and breaks in gas, water, and
electrical lines." Id.
138. Id. at 1152.
139. Id. at 1152 n.5.
140. Id. at 1153.
141. M & J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1154. The term "property" as used in the Tak-
ings Clause includes the bundle of rights inherent in the citizen's ownership.
Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 103 F.3d at 690.
145. Id. at 694. "A nonconforming use is one that lawfully existed prior to
the effective date of a zoning restriction and that is allowed to continue to exist
in nonconformity with the restriction." Id Here, the area had been zoned resi-
dential and permission was required to erect any structure other than a resi-
dence, school, church, or similar building, but the city had issued certificates of
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for the non-conforming use."6 The court never reached the is-
sue of whether there was a total taking because it decided
that the right to erect a billboard was not part of Outdoor's
title. 147
In Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States,"8 the
Army Corps of Engineers refused to grant Palm Beach Isles
Associates a permit to dredge and fill the Associates' prop-
erty.1 49 Holding that a navigational servitude5 ° may consti-
tute a background principle affecting a property owner's
rights, which would then provide the Government with a de-
fense to a takings claim,"' the court applied Lucas in lieu of
using the Penn Central factors."2  According to the Palm
Beach court, when the regulation results in a denial of all the
economically viable use of the property, the only remaining
issue is whether the government has a defense that, under a
background principle of property law, the interest was never
vested in the owner."3 The court decided that the Associate's
property was subject to a navigational servitude,"' which is a
"pre-existing limitation on the landowner's title.""' Thus, the
court provided the government with a defense to the alleged
taking as long as the government also showed "that the regu-
latory imposition was for a purpose related to navigation."
56
In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,"7 the court affirmed
the use of custom".8 as a background principle of property law.
nonconforming use for the billboards. Id. at 692.
146. Id. at 692-93.
147. Id. at 694.
148. 208 F.3d at 1374.
149. Id. at 1337.
150. The navigational servitude, derived from the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, gives the federal government the right to regulate
and control the waters of the United States. Id. at 1382.
151. Id. at 1384.
152. Id. The Penn Centralfactors include the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
action. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
153. Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1379.
154. Id. at 1382.
155. Id. at 1384 (quoting United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790,
796 (3d Cir. 1996)).
156. Id. at 1384-85.
157. Stevens, 854 P.2d at 449.
158. The common law doctrine of custom includes the following elements:
(1) It]he land has been used in this manner so long "that the memory of
man runneth not to the contrary"; (2) without interruption; (3) peace-
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There, the city had denied the land owners permission to
build a seawall on their property.'59 Applying and interpret-
ing Lucas, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the com-
mon-law doctrine of custom is part of the background princi-
ples of the state's property law.6 '
The last notable decision that relied upon a background
principle of property law is Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City
of Seattle.' In Esplanade, the city of Seattle denied the
plaintiffs application to develop certain shoreline property.'62
The plaintiffs property was navigable for the purpose of pub-
lic recreation and thus subject to the public trust doctrine.'63
Development of Esplanade's tideland property would have in-
terfered with recreational uses,'" justifying the government's
efforts to protect the public trust at the expense of the plain-
tiffs investment. 16
3. Cases Finding a Taking
Two additional cases are important in examining judicial
interpretation of regulatory takings: Pascoag Reservoir &
Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island" and Preseault v. United
States.'67 In both cases, the courts found that there had been
a taking under the Fifth Amendment. In Pascoag, the state
ably; (4) the public use has been appropriate to the land and the usages
of the community; (5) the boundary is certain; (6) the custom is obliga-
tory, i.e., it is not left up to individual landowners as to whether they
will recognize the public's right to access; and (7) the custom is not re-
pugnant or inconsistent with other customs or laws.
Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 450.
160. Id. at 456-57 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003).
161. Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 978.
162. Id. at 980.
163. Id. at 987. Citing the Washington Supreme Court, the district court ex-
plained that:
the "state's ownership of tidelands and shorelands is comprised of two
distinct aspects-the jus privatum and the jus publicum." Relevant
here, the "juspublicum, or public trust doctrine, is the right 'of naviga-
tion, together with its incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming,
water skiing, and other related recreational purposes generally re-
garded as corollary to the right of navigation and the use of public wa-
ters.'"
Id. at 985 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 987.
165. See id.
166. PascoagReservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
167. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1525.
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attempted to seize property using the theories of adverse pos-
session and prescriptive easement.'9 The question the court
addressed was whether the state could acquire property
through adverse possession or a prescriptive easement with-
out being subject to the Takings Clause.'69 Although there
was a potential physical takings claim, 7 ' the court applied a
Lucas analysis, as the state had precluded all of plaintiffs
economically beneficial use of the property. 7' The court noted
that the state may not simply recast its action as a back-
ground principle of state law.7 2 The basis for the action must
be more than a pre-existing regulation.' 3 Ultimately, the
court found that there was a taking; however, the plaintiffs
claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations.' 4
Preseault was another case in which the court held that
there had been a taking under the Takings Clause requiring
compensation.'75 The issue in the case was whether the con-
version of a railroad right of way to a public recreational hik-
ing trail was a taking.' 6 Similar to the Pascoag court, the
Preseault court noted that the background principles referred
to by the Court in Lucas were state-defined nuisance rules.'
First, the court stated that the applicable state law did not
support the suggestion that the scope of an easement limited
to railroad purposes could be read to include public recrea-
tional hiking and biking trails.' The court then eliminated
168. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209. Adverse possession
is a method of obtaining title to property without purchasing it. The claimant's
possession must be (1) actual, (2) open, (3) notorious, (4) hostile, (5) under claim
of right, (6) continuous, and (7) exclusive. Id. at 211. A prescriptive easement is
a method of obtaining the right to use another's property through open, adverse,
and continuous use similar to that of adverse possession. Id. See also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 528 (7th ed. 1999).
169. PascoagReservoir &Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
170. Although adverse possession and prescription are background principles
of state law, in addition to eliminating plaintiffs economically beneficial use of
the property, the state also effected a permanent physical taking. Id. at 226.
The court determined that a background principle analysis is only required for
regulatory takings, and as this also constituted a permanent physical taking,
the situation could require an eminent domain analysis. Id.
171. Id. at 222.
172. Id. at 221.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 209.
175. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1529.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1538.
178. Id. at 1530.
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the suggestion that background principles of state property
law should include federal regulatory legislation.' Finally,
the Court concluded that the Preseault family's use of its
property was not a public nuisance.'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Regulatory takings law has several objectives. First, it
allows the government to regulate harmful actions. The ra-
tionale for this goal provides:
As a general rule, an owner is at liberty to use his prop-
erty as he sees fit .... There is, however, a limitation to
this rule; one made necessary by the intricate, complex,
and changing life of today. The old and familiar maxim
that one must so use his property as not to injure that of
another (sic utere tuo alienum non laedas181) is deeply
imbedded in our law.1
82
These harmful actions may include the infill of wet-
lands,'83 the destruction caused by sub-surface coal mining,"
and the blocking of public access to the seashore.'85
A second goal of regulatory takings law is to protect the
property owner's interest.8 6 For example, the property owner
in Penn Central had investment-backed expectations that
needed to be protected.'87 While regulations protecting the
public are necessary, the costs of such regulation should be
borne by the public as a whole, rather than by the individual
property owners being regulated." To protect the property
179. Id. at 1539. The government had argued, unsuccessfully, that the Pre-
seaults' title incorporated federal transportation regulatory statutes. Id.
180. Id
181. See supra note 31.
182. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (N.Y. App. Div.
1932).
183. SeegenerallyPalazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
184. See generally M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
185. See generally Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993).
186. "To the Framers [of the Constitution], identifying property with freedom
meant that if you could own property, you were free. Ownership of property
was protected." Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner,
17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627, 638 (1988).
187. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
188. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (This guarantee
in the Fifth Amendment was "designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
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owner's interest and foster economic security, it is important
for a potential property owner to have a clear idea of the pos-
sible uses of his or her property, as well as the limitations on
those uses.
The current state of takings law attempts to balance the
landowner's interests against the government's regulatory ob-
jectives.'89 However, this approach has produced a "jurispru-
dential mess."9 ' For example, whether a regulation goes too
far, or whether a use constitutes a nuisance, is a determina-
tion made after the fact.' The government will not know un-
til after litigation whether a new regulation constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of a landowner's property. In addi-
tion, a landowner will not know whether his or her intended
use of property is prohibited by a background principle of
property law until after litigation.
The third goal of takings law should be to prevent the ne-
cessity of litigation. Takings law should provide the govern-
ment and the public a clear indication of what rights are in-
herent in the owner's property, when a regulation goes too
far, and where an intended use of land is prohibited by a
background principle of property law.
The per se rule of Lucas'92 does not provide sufficient clar-
ity to takings law to prevent the necessity of litigation. Since
Lucas, lower courts have interpreted the decision and the
"background principles exception" in several different ways,
providing no reliable indication of when the regulation would
be considered a taking and when compensation would be re-
quired.
borne by the public as a whole."). See also Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (The Fifth Amendment "prevents the
public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens
of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more
and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a
full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.").
189. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1003, 1006-07 (2003).
190. Id. at 1006.
191. CALLIES, supra note 12, at 13.
192. In Lucas, the Supreme Court determined that a regulation resulting in
the complete loss of economic value to a property required compensation unless
the property use in question could have been prohibited by a background prin-
ciple of property law. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32
(1992).
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IV. ANALYSIS
In determining whether Lucas fulfills the three goals of
regulatory takings law, 93 it is necessary to examine how the
lower courts have applied Lucas. As demonstrated above, the
cases may be easily divided, with a few exceptions,'94 into
three categories: those that found Lucas inapplicable because
there was not a total loss of economic value to the regulated
property, 195 those that found no taking because of some back-
ground principle of property law,' 96 and those that found a
taking requiring compensation. 197
A. Cases that Distinguish Lucas
In many circumstances, the lower courts have declined to
apply Lucas because there was not a complete loss of eco-
nomic value.99 Lucas applies to a limited and unusual excep-
193. See discussion supra Part IL.
194. For example, in Abrahim-Youi v. United States, the court held:
[I]t does not strain Lucas beyond its intended purpose to recognize that
a similar principle may apply to "property" that arises through consen-
sual international transactions as it does to property interests created
by domestic law. Certain sticks in the bundle of rights that are prop-
erty are subject to constraint by government, as part of the bargain
through which the citizen otherwise has the benefit of government en-
forcement of property rights.
Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
195. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (weighing which expert's estimate of value should be used in determining
whether there was a taking); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl.
717, 723 (2002) aftd, 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the proper de-
nominator to be used in determining whether the property had lost all of its
value).
196. See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986-87 (9th
Cir. 2002) cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003) (using the public trust doctrine to
find that compensation was not needed); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United
States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2000) affd on reh'g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (relying on a navigational servitude); Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City
of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the contested right
was never in Outdoor's title); M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148,
1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the regulation for reasons of public safety);
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993) (relying on
custom).
197. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that there was a taking, and that the regulation was not justified un-
der nuisance law); Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 209 (D. R.I. 2002) affd by 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding
that there was a taking, but the claim was time-barred).
198. See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Florida Rock Indus., 18 F.3d at 1572-73; Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at
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tion; where the government's action causes a permanent dep-
rivation of all beneficial use.1 99
In Appolo Fuels, the court determined that Lucas did not
apply, since the plaintiff did not lose the total economic value
of the property. 200 The court reached the same determination
in Rith Energy.2 1  Although the regulatory agency signifi-
cantly limited Rith's rights to mine, the company was still
permitted to mine enough coal to earn a substantial profit on
its investment in the leases.2  Finally, in Florida Rock,"' the
court held that although the miner was denied a permit to
mine limestone underneath a tract of wetlands,2° the land
had not lost all of its economic value as the owners had re-
ceived actual purchase offers for the land.2 °5
These decisions seem to follow Palazzolo,°6 which exam-
ines the value of the property as a whole, as opposed to limit-
ing the takings consideration to the regulated section of the
land. However, there is some conflict in the Supreme Court
precedent. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court held that "[w]hen the
government physically takes possession of an interest in
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to
compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the in-
terest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a
part thereof."27 This conflict creates an incentive for litiga-
tion, since a property owner might seek a determination of a
regulatory taking based on Tahoe-Sierra, even if the loss of
value would not constitute a taking through the application of
the Palazzolo denominator.
B. Cases that Apply the Background Principles Exception
The second category of post-Lucas cases involve situa-
tions where there was a complete loss of economic value, yet a
737.
199. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 324 n.19 (2002).
200. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
201. Rith Energy, 247 F.3d at 1363. See also discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
202. Rith Energy, 247 F.3d at 1363.
203. Florida Rock Indus., 18 F.3d at 1560. See also discussion supra Part
II.C.1.
204. Florida Rock Indus., 18 F.3d at 1562.
205. Id. at 1563.
206. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
207. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 (citations omitted).
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background principle of property law permits the regulation.
The common law background principles courts have relied on
include public health and safety,"' zoning," nuisance,"() anaiatoal .. 2112
navigational servitude, the public trust doctrine,212 and cus-
tom.
213
The court in M & J Coal Compan2 14 used the Lucas for-
mulation to analyze regulatory takings claims, even though a
total deprivation of economic value was not at issuer.21  The
court held that M & J's rights did not include the right to
mine in such a way as to endanger the environment, because
the company "knew or should have known that it could not
mine in such a way as to endanger public health or safety."
216
In Outdoor Graphics,2 7 Outdoor purchased property at a
bargain price, subject to a non-conforming use,218 but did not
renew the certificates for the non-conforming use. In apply-
ing Lucas to zoning regulations, the court approved the back-
ground principles exception, acknowledging that even though
"[s]uch regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminat-
ing the land's only productive use ... it does not proscribe a
productive use that was previously permissible."22°
Appolo Fuels,221 like M & J Coal Company, did not involve
a total deprivation of economic value.2  However, the court
stated that water pollution is an abatable nuisance under
both common law and statutory law.22 ' By preventing the
mining, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and En-
forcement exercised its police power to protect the local citi-
208. SeeM&JCoal, 47 F.3d at 1154.
209. See Outdoor Graphics, 103 F.3d at 695.
210. See Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. C1. at 735.
211. See Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1384.
212. See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 986-87.
213. See Stevens, 854 P.2d at 456-57.
214. M& J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1148. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
215. M&JCoal, 47 F.3d at 1153.
216. Id. at 1154.
217. Outdoor Graphics, 103 F.3d at 690. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
218. Outdoor Graphics, 103 F.3d at 694. "A nonconforming use is one that
lawfully existed prior to the effective date of a zoning restriction and that is al-
lowed to continue to exist in nonconformity with the restriction." Id.
219. Id. at 692-93.
220. Id. at 694.
221. Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 717.
222. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
223. Appolo Fuels, 54 Fed. Cl. at 735.
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zens from a nuisance.2 4 This reaffirms the Supreme Court's
use of nuisance as a background principle of property law.
The court in Palm Beach Isle. 25 found that the naviga-
tional servitude may be a part of the background principles to
property law.226 Since a property owner's rights are subject to
the background principles of property law, a navigational ser-
vitude may provide the government with a defense to a tak-
ings claim. 7
In Stevens,2 8 where the land owners had requested per-
mission to build a seawall on their property,229 the court af-
firmed the use of custom as a background principle of prop-
erty law.2 0 The Supreme Court of Oregon,23' in applying and
interpreting Lucas, held that "the common-law doctrine of
custom... 'inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nui-
sance already placed upon land ownership.'
21 2
The last notable decision that relied upon a background
principle of property law is Esplanade Properties.3 In Es-
planade Properties, the court held that some background
principles placing restrictions on property ownership may be
found in the public trust doctrine. 2' The court's opinion indi-
cates that Lucas effectively recognizes the public trust doc-
trine in its exception for background principles of property
law;2 . therefore, it is suited to cases such as Esplanade Prop-
erties.
It is difficult to discern from these various cases how Lu-
cas might limit regulatory takings. Examining the above
cases more closely, the courts determined that the regulations
at issue were merely codifications of the common law princi-
ples that permitted the government's actions. If most states
have similar background principles, it is difficult to predict
224. Id.
225. 208 F.3d 1374. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
226. Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1384.
227. Id.
228. Stevens, 854 P.2d at 449. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
229. Stevens, 854 P.2d at 450.
227. Id. at 456-57.
231. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach was decided by the Oregon Supreme
Court. Id. at 499.
232. Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
233. Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 978.
234. Id. at 986-87. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
235. Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 986.
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when a regulation enforcing that principle would be deemed a
taking. The inquiry will entail, at the very least, a case-by-
case state nuisance analysis.236 This does not provide the suf-
ficient clarity to takings law necessary to prevent litigation.
C. Cases Where There Was a Taking
Two other cases are important in examining judicial in-
terpretation of regulatory takings following Lucas. In both
Pascoag Reservoir" & Dam v. Rhode Island 37 and Preseault v.
United States,38 the courts found that there had been a tak-
219ing. In Pascoag, the court noted that the state may not
simply recast its action as a background principle of state law
to qualify under Lucas.40 Instead, the state action must be
more than a pre-existing regulation.211 Furthermore, the
court placed the burden of proof on the state to show that the
claimed background principle allowed the regulation. In
Preseault, the court noted, as the Pascoag court did, that the
background principles referred to by the Supreme Court in
Lucas were state-defined nuisance rules, 2 3 and declined to in-
clude federal regulatory legislation as part of those back-
ground principles.
Both Pascoag and Preseault highlight limitations that
courts may consider when applying a Lucas analysis. Impor-
236. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31. As factors in a nuisance analysis, the Court
listed:
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private
property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the social value of
the claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in ques-
tion.., the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adja-
cent private landowners) alike, [t]he fact that a particular use has long
been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack
of any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so,
[and] the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted
to continue the use denied to the claimant.
Id. (citations omitted).
237. 217 F. Supp. 2d at 206. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
238. 100 F.3d at 1525. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
239. In Pascoag, the court found that there was a taking, but that the plain-
tiffs claim was time-barred. PascoagReservior & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
240. Id. at 221.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1538.
244. Id. at 1539.
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tantly, a federal or state regulation is not automatically part
of a state's background principles of property law.245  This
strict interpretation of background principles exception, limit-
ing the background principles to state-defined nuisance
246
rules, contrasts with the lower court cases finding several
different background principles that prevent the government
from compensating for a taking under the Takings Clause.247
Furthermore, the limitations create confusion as to how ex-
pansively the courts will interpret Lucas. This confusion il-
lustrates how Lucas does not meet the ultimate goal of tak-
ings law-preventing the necessity of litigation. The cases do
not give the government and the public a clear indication of
what rights are inherent in the owner's property, when a
regulation will go too far, and where an intended use of the
land is prohibited by a background principle of property law.
D. The Effect ofLucas
After examining the lower court cases distinguishing or
utilizing the Lucas decision, a more complete picture of Lucas'
effect is discernible. According to the Court, "Lucas carved
out a narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory tak-
ings for the 'extraordinary circumstance' of a permanent dep-
rivation of all beneficial use."4 The Court intended Lucas to
apply only in the most extreme circumstances: when a regula-
tion results in a total taking of all economic value of a regu-
lated property. 9 However, its effect has been much greater.
According to the court in Moore 
The effect, then, of Lucas was to dramatically change the
third criterion [i.e. the character of the governmental ac-
tion], from one in which the courts, including federal
courts, were called upon to make ad hoc balancing deci-
sions, balancing private property rights against state
regulatory policy, to one in which state property law, in-
245. Pascoag Reservior & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (citing Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 629-30).
246. Preseaut, 100 F.3d at 1538.
247. Courts have relied on public health and safety, zoning, navigational ser-
vitudes, the public trust doctrine, and custom, in addition to nuisance law as
background principles of property law. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
248. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324 n.19.
249. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
250. Moore v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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corporating common law nuisance doctrine, controls."'
Before Lucas, courts weighed the three Penn Central fac-
tors252 to determine if there had been a taking and if compen-
sation was required. As the court in Philip Morris, Inc. v.
RelJ/ 5 3 observed, Lucas has created one stark difference in
takings law:21 "once a per se rule has been announced, future
courts do not have the luxury to consider the public interest,
reasonable investment-backed expectations, or economic im-
pact. 2 5 Now, the third factor can be a complete defense to a
per se regulatory taking; therefore the weight of the third fac-
tor in a Penn Centralbalancing has expanded. Arguably, one
could claim that this third factor is now a complete defense
for all takings, total or not.
As Lucas has fundamentally changed the Penn Central
balancing equation, courts must now examine state common
law, specifically property law. Requiring courts to examine
the states' background principles of property law can have
both positive and negative effects. For example, the common
law of nuisance is extremely malleable, especially at the state
court level.256 If courts continue to apply the background
principles exception, such as the nuisance doctrine, expan-
sively, its utility and appeal to state regulators will increase
as well.257 This could be considered a benefit, especially to en-
vironmentalists, but also a cost to the private landowners.
For all its problems and limitations, it is important to
note that Lucas still allows the government to regulate poten-
tially harmful actions. Various courts have relied upon dif-
ferent common law principles to permit the government to
prevent harmful activity. Furthermore, it is also possible to
argue that Lucas protects the property owners' interests by
ensuring that any owner will receive compensation in the
251. Id. at 610 (citing Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
252. The Penn Central factors include the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
253. 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
254. Id. at 36.
255. Id.
256. Babcock, supra note 7, at 19.
257. Id. at 25.
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case of a complete taking.258 Nonetheless, if courts do decide
to apply the background principles exception expansively, Lu-
cas might not be sufficient to ensure that the public will bear
the costs of the regulations. Additionally, such a reliance
upon background principles will not give the government and
the public a clear indication of what rights are inherent in the
owner's property and thus will not diminish the necessity of
litigation.
V. PROPOSAL
The three primary goals of regulatory takings law are to
(1) ensure that governments have the power to control and
prevent potentially harmful actions, (2) protect the property
owner's rights and investments in the land, and (3) prevent
litigation by balancing the government's interest with the
landowner's interest in such a way as to provide a clear test
for when a regulation will cause a taking and require com-
pensation.2 59 To achieve these goals, regulatory takings law
must undergo certain modifications.
Currently, regulatory takings law requires a state or lo-
cal government first to pass a law regulating property. Then,
if the property owners feel this regulation goes too far, they
may sue the government for effecting a "taking" of their prop-
erty under the Fifth Amendment. However, the Supreme
Court has "generally eschewed any 'set formula' for determin-
ing how far is too far, preferring to 'engage in ... essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries."26° As a result, "[o]ur takings doc-
trine is both lacking in theory and unpredictable in applica-
tion. ,
261
Instead of relying upon courts to make these after-the-
fact, case-by-case determinations, federal and state legislative
bodies should preemptively reform the regulatory process to
ensure more consistency in the law. Increased knowledge re-
garding the regulations prior to their enactment will lead to
greater clarity in property law and thus less litigation. The
legislative bodies should explicitly enumerate the basis, costs,
258. See Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1525; PascoagReservior& Dam, 217 F. Supp.
2d at 206.
259. See discussion supra Part III.
260. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing Penn
Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
261. Fee, supra note 189, at 1006.
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and benefits of the regulations.
First, the legislative bodies should include the basis for
each new regulation in the statute. If the government could
specify what principles the legislature was relying upon and
where those principles would be found in the background
principles of the state's property law, the government would
have greater confidence that the new law would not effect a
taking. Additionally, property owners would have a better
indication of their property rights, including what they can
use their property for and when they will be compensated for
restrictions imposed upon it.
Second, if each governing body at the local, state, and
federal level was required to undergo a thorough cost-benefit
analysis before passing new regulations, the economic ramifi-
cations of each proposed regulation would be clearer to both
private property owners and the public. Under this method,
regulatory agencies would have a better estimate of the new
regulations' impact on the economic value of private property
and the assessed benefits to the public. Therefore, govern-
ments would be able to weigh these costs and benefits with
the potential compensation costs for the owners. Full knowl-
edge of the costs would in turn promote more meaningful pub-
lic scrutiny of the action, thereby ensuring public participa-
tion, knowledge, and approval of the proposed action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Taking law is constantly evolving. One of the most re-
cent changes came with the Lucas decision, which added the
second per se rule to the takings law.262 In Lucas, the Su-
preme Court held that compensation for a regulatory taking
under the Fifth Amendment is not required if the property
use in question could have been prohibited by "the restric-
tions that background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership."26
The Supreme Court has returned twice to Lucas,2" and
262. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. The first per se rule of takings law was ad-
vanced in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
There, the Court held that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by gov-
ernment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve."
Id. at 426.
263. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
264. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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lower courts have added their own interpretations of Lucas to
the current case law.26 Most of the cases have held that the
regulation at issue did not cause a total loss of value. 266 Even
when the courts did conclude that there had been a total tak-
ing, many courts found that the government had a valid de-
fense of a background principle of property law.267 Finally,
some courts have decided cases to find a regulatory taking re-
quiring compensation.6 8 This uncertainty introduced by the
per se rule of Lucas does little to advance the goal of prevent-
ing the necessity of litigation.
To provide the certainty in takings law necessary to pre-
vent further litigation, the legislature should change its prac-
tices regarding takings law. Instead of the court answering
the question of whether the action is prohibited by a back-
ground principle of property law after enactment of the regu-
lation, the legislature should construct the regulation in such
a way as to avoid confusion in the first place. The govern-
ment should undergo an in-depth cost-benefit analysis for
each proposed regulation and should also include the basis for
the regulations in the statutes. By including the background
principles upon which the regulations rely upon, property
owners would have a clear sense of the rights inherent in the
title of their property and the restrictions they face. Without
these reforms, it is likely that the regulatory takings law will
continue to be made on an ad hoc, case-by-case factual basis.
It is acknowledged that private landowners are subject to
some limitations as to the uses of their property: "[c]ertain
sticks in the bundle of rights that are property are subject to
constraint by government, as part of the bargain through
which the citizen otherwise has the benefit of government en-
265. See discussion supra Part II.C; Part IV.
266. See Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 131
(2d Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 104 (2004); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United
States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Henry v. Jefferson County Plan-
ning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706-07 (N.D. W. Va. 2001).
267. See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986-87 (9th
Cir. 2002) cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United
States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2000) affd on rehg, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 695 (8th
Cir. 1996); M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993).
268. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (D.
R.I. 2002) afTd, 337 F,3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003).
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forcement of property rights."269 The goal of regulatory tak-
ings law is to ensure that the government has the power to
protect the environment and the public without placing the
burden on a few property owners. Taking law must continue
to evolve until it meets that goal.
269. Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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